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1. Introduction
European professional soccer has shown dynamic economic growth over the past
decade. Some of the top clubs (companies) invest in excess of 50 million EUR an-
nually in their players and management as they vie for success on and off the pitch.
Human capital, which is comprised predominantly of players and coaches, is without
doubt the central factor of production. The economics of soccer is growing parallelly
to the economic significance of the industry. Economists prefer to measure perfor-
mance in relative rather than absolute terms. As do the fans: “They made the most
of what they had” or “they didn’t live up to their potential” is typical commen-
tary as to the seasonal performance of a team. Behind this stands the theoretical
concept of the production function of a soccer corporation. Clubs invest in players,
coaches, and management in order to succeed in the several competitions they take
part and thereby increase revenue from the gate, broadcasting rights, merchandising
and sponsoring. Of course most clubs still consider success on the pitch and the glory
of victory as their main business objective. However, clubs are also focussing more
and more on the economic ramifications of their striving for success: Shareholders
expect a risk-adequate return on their investment, creditors require solid cash flow
and interest coverage. Given that for all clubs in a national league the same produc-
tion technology applies, the managerial efficiency of each can be measured in terms
of success relative to their potential.
There exists a strand of recent literature on sporting production functions, which
differs in three primary characteristics: the league(s) under investigation, the choice
of input and output variables1, and the statistical technique or econometric strategy2
1For example, success of the single coach vs. success of the team (firm) as the dependent variable.
2Several authors, like, e.g., Haas (2003) for US Major League Soccer, apply the non-parametric,
deterministic technique of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to measure (productive) efficiency in
the context of team performance. However, as no one would seriously deny that a certain amount
of chance or statistical noise influences the results of football matches (as the central element of
sporting and economic success of the clubs), we abstract from considering the deterministic DEA
approach in the present study.
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followed. Most of this work has dealt with U.S. major league sports (primarily Major
League Baseball), as pioneered by Rottenberg (1956). As for soccer the focus so far
has been on the English F.A. Premiership; see Carmichael et al. (1999), Dawson
et al. (2000), Dobson and Goddard (2001, Ch. 5, Sect. 5.2-5.3), and Gerrard
(2001). Carmichael et al. (1999) estimate a team’s performance production function
using OLS regressions only. The same holds for Gerrard (2001) who concentrates on
the win-ratios of the coaches working in the Premier League from 1992-1998. The
OLS approach falls short in that only an average efficiency production function is
estimated not the full scale one. Efficiency in this case can only be assessed relative
to the “average club” not to the individual full efficiency benchmark. Dawson et al.
(2000) compare the efficiency rankings from an OLS regression to those resultant from
their stochastic frontier analytic estimates. For the years 1992-1998, they examine
what coaches could make of a certain amount of playing talent in terms of success in
the Premiership.
Our study is the first to look at the German top league, i.e. the Erste Bundesliga,
using stochastic frontier analysis. Inputs are the ex ante fixed wages for the players
and the coach, while several team- and season-specific characteristics are controlled
for. Most studies measure success on the pitch in terms of league performance: As
it is obvious that clubs base their investment decisions to a high degree on the a
priori knowledge whether or not they participate in the international competitions,
we define an output variable “score” (henceforth SCO). SCO summarizes the success
of German Bundesliga3 clubs in all competitions in one value. Economic output is
measured in terms of revenues. We look at the two subsequent seasons 1999/00 and
2000/01 assessing the team performances separately for each season. Therefore, we
investigate a pooled one-period-model with the teams’ pre-season market investments
in players and coaches judged by output the following summer; cf. Dawson et al.
3We use the term Bundesliga to denote the German top league, i.e. Erste Bundesliga. Actually,
there exist the Erste Bundesliga and the Zweite Bundesliga (both containing 18 teams, respectively).
However, due to its common usage and since some of the analyzed teams were top league members
only in one of the investigated seasons, it seems better not to multiply terms.
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(2000). Analyzing a two season pool, we face 36 observations for the 21 Bundesliga
teams participating in one or both years. Investigating which teams consistently
operated efficiently or inefficiently in these two subsequent seasons from 1999-2001
is a first step in examining the development or constancy of efficiency. Scarcity
of the relevant Bundesliga data so far impedes a longer horizon, the implication of
autoregressive parts in our regressions, as well as the estimation of time-dependent
efficiencies and panel data models.4 All the more, our study aims to shed some light
on the managerial transformation process from human capital to measurable output
- a “black box” and source of weekly speculation - in German top league soccer.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the
dataset used, preliminaries, and applied methods. Section 3 reports our findings on
sporting and economic efficiency, respectively. And finally, Section 4 concludes.
2. Data and Stochastic Production Frontier Methodology
2.1 Choice and Adjustment of Data
In the present study productive output of soccer clubs is measured not only by the
success on the pitch but also by adjusted total revenues (henceforth REV). In con-
trast to existing related work, we quantify athletic output not only for the national
but also for the international European competitions. The following paragraphs focus
on the outline of our pecuniary variables of investigation. For detail on our sport-
ing output measure SCO the reader is referred to Appendix A.1. While there is
an amazing amount of data available on sporting results and performances for most
European professional national soccer leagues, economic data on soccer clubs is gen-
erally scarce. One notable exception is England, where many soccer companies are
listed on stock exchanges and therefore must by law publish their annual reports. In
Germany the only club to undertake an initial public offering until the end of 2002
was Borussia Dortmund. At this time an additional seven clubs were constituted
joint-stock companies. However, this does not imply that they necessarily have to
4This problem, especially, applies to data for ex ante wages.
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make their balance sheets available to the public. This is one reason we choose figures
of revenues rather than, e.g., (operating) profits. Operating profits are “defined” in
quite different ways by managements before presentation in the general meetings of
the club members. Furthermore most club managements do not follow a stringent
shareholder value orientation. Ultimately, this is the result of generic moral hazard:
The central incentive of management is the generation of glory, the result of wins and
club titles, and in so doing maximizing their own reputation or popularity rather than
the club’s profits. Where available, data for total revenues, for the respective season,
are taken from the income statements of the clubs - otherwise from the studies of the
WGZ-Bank (2001, 2002). However, it would be desirable to isolate the output that
depends exclusively on the performance and management in the respective season.
Identifying exact marginal gate revenues, marginal merchandising income, or the like
is impossible. The adjustment suggested in the following is a step in the direction to
unravel performance-dependent output. The league’s income from TV-broadcasting
rights by the end of the last decade was as follows: In 1999/00 every club in the
Bundesliga received a fixed TV-rights-transfer of approximately 6 million EUR. In
2000/01 a new TV-broadcasting contract nearly doubled the two top leagues’ income
from 212 million EUR to 386 million EUR a year. For this substantial additional
cash-flow, the clubs agreed on creating a variable income component that should for
more than 80 percent (i.e. 83%) depend on the respective Bundesliga-club’s finishing
positions in the three preceding years. The rest was hooked to the performances in
the respective season. To take this effect into account, we subtract from a club’s rev-
enues the respective certain pay-off through TV-broadcasting rights at the beginning
of the season, i.e. the fixed and the 3-year-payments.
Scarcity of balance sheet data for German clubs explains why we base our econo-
metric analysis of REV and SCO mainly on wage bill data, rather than on data
on equity or total capital employed. However, wages can only reasonably proxy
management-installed human capital if they do not include bonus payments and
premia that are received during and depend on the productive process, i.e. the intra-
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seasonal performances. This leads us to use pre-seasonal estimates of the wage sums
of players (PLW) and coaches (COW) instead of end-of-season data due to the fact
that the former are independent of a teams future intra-seasonal success. These
data are published at the beginning of each season by the German sports magazine
Der Kicker. They capture usable means of production. Their installation (bargains
and recruitments on the transfer markets, etc.) and transformation into measurable
output are the chief task of the manager.5
2.2 The Black Box: Productive Process, Technology and Returns to Scale
The present section outlines and reports our benchmark estimates, where we im-
plicitly assume that all clubs either produce efficiently or deviate from an average
efficiency by noise only. Besides the above outlined two elementary productive input
factors, we consider a range of dummy variables to control for different characteris-
tics in the course of the managerial “black box”-production process. The impact of
the following, mainly qualitative, variables on the economic and athletic output of
our sample’s clubs is investigated: (i) participation in an international competition
(INT), i.e. in the UEFA-Cup (UEF) or the UEFA Champions League (CHL), (ii) fan
potential according to the recent UFA study (UFA)6, (iii) net intra-seasonal trans-
fers of players (NPL), (iv) the intra-seasonal signing up of a new coach (NCO),7 and
finally (v) a dummy to control for a change of technological level, in the sense of the
popular Solow residual, from season 1999/00 to 2000/01 (S01).
To move beyond the slogan of quantitatively assessing some sort of ad hoc produc-
5Cf. the comprehensive discussion of this argumentation on the transformation of ex ante inputs
into ex post performance in the context of sporting production functions in Dawson et al. (2000).
6See UFA Sports GmbH (2000), where the brand potential of German Bundesliga clubs is assessed
on the base of interviews from a sample identifying 21.5 million soccer fans in Germany. Among
a set of other questions, participants were asked for their (main) supporting of a certain club.
Unfortunately, the study reports the first nine most frequently mentioned Bundesliga clubs only.
To overcome the problem of a truncated ordinal regressor, we decided for a binary top-brand rather
than a categorial dummy.
7Note, in his study based on data of the Dutch national soccer league, Koning (2003) finds that
intra-seasonal firing and hiring of coaches does not improve team performance.
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tion process, we test the straightforward Cobb-Douglas technology Y = A (Hp)α (Hc)β,
where Hp and Hc denote ex ante human capital of players and coaches, respectively,
against a more flexible translog specification. In log-linearized form, we consider:
yi = β0 + β1h
p
i + β2h
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where minor letters denote expressions in natural logs, β0 = ln (Ai) ,β1 = α,β2 =
β, etc. εi represents an i.i.d. normal error term and Q a matrix of j = 1, ..., C
control variables. While the former specification (1) imposes constant elasticities of
substitution, the linearized translog production function (2) obviously nests Cobb-
Douglas and allows for flexible elasticities. Actually, we consider C = 5 control
variables as given by (i) to (v) above. Furthermore, we use ex ante wage bills of
players (PLW) and coaches (COW) to proxy Hp and Hc, respectively. As output
variables Y , we consider REV and SCO. For detail on the construction and sources
of variables as well as descriptive statistics of our non-dummy variables see Section
2.1 and the Appendix.
As can be seen from Table 1, an F-Test on the joint hypothesis β3 = β4 = β5 = 0
is on all conventional levels of significance and for both dependent variables, i.e.
ln(REV) and ln(SCO), unable to reject the null of a Cobb-Douglas (CD) technol-
ogy. Obviously, neither the null of a CD-type production function nor the one of
homoskedasticity can be rejected on the one percentage level of significance.
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Table 1. F- (CD vs. Translog) and White-Test for pooled regressions: 99/00 and 00/018
Dependent variable: ln(REV) ln(SCO)
F-Statistics: 2.112
(0.121)
0.797
(0.505)
for H0: Cobb-Douglas technology
F-Statistics (White): 1.260
(0.314)
0.620
(0.753)
for H0: Homoskedasticity
Note: p-values in parentheses.
Table 2. Results for pooled regressions: 99/00 and 00/01; baseline production function:
Cobb Douglas type technology and no efficiency decomposition of error terms
Table 2 (a) Dependent variable is economic output, i.e. ln(REV)9
spec. CONST ln(PLW) ln(COW) UFA NPL NCO CHL S01
S1 0.325
(1.051)
1.169***
(9.863)
S2 0.944
(1.566)
0.974***
(4.823)
0.186
(1.194)
S3 1.960***
(3.069)
0.542**
(2.341)
0.380**
(2.469)
0.380***
(2.993)
S4 2.083***
(3.202)
0.524**
(2.255)
0.405**
(2.597)
0.458***
(2.903)
-.122
(-.996)
S5 2.062***
(3.133)
0.539**
(2.285)
0.400**
(2.531)
0.443***
(2.746)
-.103
(-.806)
-.090
(-.624)
S6 2.246***
(4.096)
0.410**
(2.065)
0.313**
(2.354)
0.421***
(3.144)
-.145
(-1.36)
-.088
(-.734)
0.592***
(3.811)
S7 2.083***
(3.954)
0.516**
(2.640)
0.294**
(2.326)
0.385***
(3.000)
-.124
(-1.22)
-.052
(-.456)
0.515***
(3.389)
-.211**
(-2.04)
Fit S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
adj. R2 0.733 0.736 0.806 0.787 0.785 0.850 0.865
log L -17.0 -16.3 -11.8 -11.3 -11.0 -3.78 -1.27
Note: *, **, *** denotes significance on 10, 5, 1% level of significance; t-values given in parentheses.
8Note, as will be outlined later, the model for economic output, i.e. for the endogenous variable
ln(REV), considers UFA, CHL, and S01, while the model for ln(SCO) controls for participation in
international cups (INT) only.
9Note, we also considered UEFA cup participation (UEF) as well as the more general participation
in international cups (INT = CHL + UEF). However, we obtain best results for the specifications of
Table 2 (a), in terms of significance, by including exclusively CHL.
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Table 2 (b) Dependent variable is athletic output, i.e. ln(SCO)
spec. CONST ln(PLW) ln(COW) UFA NPL NCO INT S01
S1 0.392
(1.223)
0.593***
(4.820)
S2 0.639
(1.002)
0.515***
(2.416)
0.073
(0.449)
S3 1.222
(1.653)
0.268
(1.000)
0.185
(1.040)
0.270
(1.484)
S4 1.388*
(1.855)
0.243
(0.910)
0.219
(1.221)
0.253
(1.393)
-.165
(-1.17)
S5 1.328*
(1.812)
0.285
(1.087)
0.204
(1.159)
0.210
(1.173)
-.112
(-0.78)
-.252
(-1.55)
S6 1.284**
(1.978)
0.227
(0.974)
0.091
(0.573)
0.103
(0.634)
-.171
(-1.33)
-.253*
(-1.76)
0.465***
(3.040)
S7 1.375***
(2.110)
0.167
(0.701)
0.109
(0.680)
0.126
(0.774)
-.182
(-1.42)
-.277**
(-1.92)
0.475***
(3.114)
0.139
(1.113)
Fit S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
adj. R2 0.388 0.373 0.395 0.402 0.429 0.552 0.555
log L -18.4 -18.3 -17.1 -16.3 -14.9 -9.98 -9.20
Note: *, **, *** denotes significance on 10, 5, 1% level of significance; t-values given in parentheses.
While in the case of economic success (dependent variable natural log of REV),
we find a significant decrease of the technological residual from season 1999/00 to
2000/01, there is no significant inter-seasonal change in technology for athletic out-
put; see the last entries of Table 2 (a) and (b). As expected, with regard to, e.g.,
the merchandising industry, the fan potential variable UFA shows a positive, highly
significant impact on revenues, while it is estimated insignificantly in the explanation
of our scores variable SCO. One reason might lie in the truncation of the demand
for tickets (especially, for top matches) due to limited capacity of the stadiums. This
restriction of capacity puts the impact of (potential) supporters on sporting success
into perspective. For both regression exercises reported in Table 2,10 participation
in international competition(s), as reflected by CHL and INT, respectively, has a
10Consisting in specifications S1 to S7, respectively.
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decisive, significant impact on output.11
Our detailed CD-type production function estimates of choice, generating the best
overall fit, are
ln (REV ) = 1.936
(3.760)
+ 0.545
(2.813)
ln (PLW )+ 0.271
(2.168)
ln (COW )
+ 0.403
(3.169)
UFA+ 0.485
(3.219)
CHL− 0.237
(−2.345)
S01; (3)
corresponding goodness of fit measures: Adj. R2: 0.865, logL: −2.555, F-stat.:
45.973, AIC: 0.475, SC: 0.739 and
ln (SCO) =0.751
(1.298)
+ 0.376
(1.891)
ln (PLW )− 0.006
(−0.044)
ln (COW )+ 0.455
(2.875)
INT ; (4)
corresponding goodness of fit measures: Adj. R2: 0.486, logL: −14.201, F-stat.:
12.070, AIC: 1.011, SC: 1.187. For both, (3) and (4), t-values are given in parenthe-
ses..
Although the F-Test displayed in Table 1 favors CD as opposed to the more
flexible translog specification, the constant, i.e. the natural log of the parameter of
technology A (in other words, the Solow residual), as well as the coaching variable
COW show no significant impact in estimation (4). Additionally, the players input
variable is significant on the ten percentage level only and the overall fit is not really
impressing.12 This leads us to consider also a simple “AK”-model of the form Y =
A (Hp)α, where A = eβ0+γ1INT , α = β1, and PLW proxying the exclusive input factor
Hp. For our 1999/00 and 2000/01 pool, the following OLS estimate results
ln (SCO) =0.772
(2.438)
+ 0.370
(2.759)
ln (PLW )+ 0.453
(2.963)
INT ; (4’)
corresponding goodness of fit measures: Adj. R2: 0.502, logL: −14.202, F-stat.:
18.668, AIC: 0.955, SC: 1.087.
11Due to collinearity problems, we restricted the regressions to one international participation
dummy and based our choice on the respective explanatory power.
12One reason for the latter might be that an average production frontier is not the adequate
specification. However, this reasoning is only suggestive for an error decomposition (in pure noise
and efficiency) and not a significance based test. We will investigate this further using likelihood
ratio tests and a test suggested by Coelli (1995) in Section 2.3.
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Abstracting from the constant that is significant on the five percentage level, the
remaining parameter coefficients of the linearized AK production function are now
significant on all conventional levels. Estimates (4) and (4’) suggest the interpretation
that players and their talent are the decisive input for athletic output. According to
(3) and (4’) a one percentage increase in PLW increases REV (SCO) by about 0.55
(0.37) %. The participation in the European cups, as reflected by INT in (4’), has an
impact on the obtained scores per definitionem (see Appendix A.1) and potentially
through accumulated experience.
The literature on the economics of European top league team sports suggests that
the market structure of the leagues is characterized by “rat races” and coordination
failures; see, e.g., Szymanski and Smith (1997) for the English Association Football
League and Akerlof (1976) in general. Therefore, we would not expect constant or
increasing but rather decreasing returns to scale to be at work in the Bundesliga. Not
surprisingly, our estimates cannot reject the hypothesis of decreasing returns to scale
on all conventional levels of significance (the detailed F-Test results are available on
request from the authors).
2.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Stochastic Frontiers
The central idea of stochastic frontier analysis to distinguish between shifts in the
technological frontier and efficiency, i.e. a movement towards or away from the tech-
nological frontier, can best be illustrated by a schematic multi-panel figure, as given
at the end of the Appendix. The three panels compare the output of two sample
teams, j and k, as a function of human capital input H. Given the same production
technology, the higher output of club k in comparison to club j can occur for four
possible reasons: First, this can be due to differences in input levels, as displayed in
the top panel. Second, the technological base level of production may differ between
the two clubs, with the consequence that for the same level of inputs different out-
puts result; see the second panel. In this case, the technological lead is measured
as Ak − Aj = Yk − Yj . Third, it might be that club j produces less efficiently than
club k. In other words, both clubs face the same frontier and the same input level,
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however, output of team j is lower; see bottom panel. Here, inefficiency is given by
the distance uj −uk = Yk−Yj . Finally, differences might be due to a combination of
these three plus noise. The isolated Solow residual fails to discriminate between the
second and third situation (displayed in the second and third panel), while stochastic
frontier methods allow this important distinction.
The most general model in the class of stochastic production frontier specifications
is that by Battese and Coelli (1995). It is formulated for panel data with firm effects
that are assumed to be distributed as half or truncated normal random variables,
whereby these effects may be modelled by some regressors (so called technical effi-
ciency, henceforth TE, effects models), and may be permitted to vary systematically
over time.
yit = xitβ + (vit − uit) for i = 1, ..., N and t = 1, ..., T, (5)
mit = zitδ, where
- yit denotes the natural log of production of the i-th micro unit in the t-th time
period;
- xit is a k × 1 vector consisting of control variables and input quantities (in
natural log expression) of the i-th micro-unit in the t-th time period;
- β is a vector of unknown coefficients, over which the likelihood will be maxi-
mized;
- vit represent random variables which are assumed to be i.i.d. N

0,σ2v

and
independent of the
- uit = uie
−η(t−T ) non-negative random variables which are assumed (i) to ac-
count for technical inefficiency in production and (ii) to be independently dis-
tributed as truncations at zero of the N

mit,σ2u

distribution; where mit is
defined above and
- zit is a p× 1 vector of variables which may influence the efficiency of a micro-
economic unit; and
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- δ is an 1 × p vector of unknown coefficients, over which the likelihood will be
maximized, and for which δ0 = µ.
The cross-sectional nature of our dataset allows for specification (5) the case of T = 1
(cross-section) and η = 0 (time-invariant inefficiency) only. Depending on the choice
of specifying δ as zero-vector or not, we suppose an error decomposition frontier or a
TE effects model, respectively. Imposing for the former µ = mi = m = 0, we obtain a
half-normal specification of the distribution of inefficiencies ui. With no assumption
on µ, the truncated normal specification of Stevenson (1980) results. For µ = 0,
it is implicitly assumed that the inefficiency effects ui are distributed half-normal
(HN), whereas the specification of Stevenson (1980) is more general, inasmuch it
only supposes a truncated normal (TN) distribution without restriction on its first
moment.
Following the parameterization of Battese and Coelli (1995), we use the replace-
ment of σ2v and σ
2
u with σ
2 = σ2v + σ
2
u and ρ =
σ2u
σ2v+σ2u
. As a result parameter ρ lies
between 0 and 1. This range can be searched to provide a starting value for use
in an iterative maximization process like the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell (DFP) algo-
rithm. We consider three distributions of ui in the course of our estimation strategy:
First, the (nested) standard normal (corresponding likelihood maximizing objective:
max{β;ui} L), second, the HN (corresponding objective: max{β;ρ} L), and, finally, the
TN (corresponding objective: max{β;ρ;µ} L) as proposed by Stevenson (1980). For all
three distributional assumptions on the inefficiency vector, we also estimate the re-
spective TE specification, where we consider COWi asmi-variable (directly impacting
on the efficiency of a team). The intuition behind this specification is that especially
the respective coach is responsible for the creation of an “efficiency-environment” in
the production of athletic and (maybe less so) economic performance. Additionally,
we refine the three-step estimation strategy of Battese and Coelli; see Coelli (1992):13
Accordingly, the three steps are:
13Actually, we partly rely on their freeware Fotran77 program FRONTIER 4.1, i.e. the latest
follow-up version of FRONTIER 2.0, as outlined in Coelli (1992).
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1) Obtain OLS estimates of the production function at stake.
2) Conduct a two-phase grid search of ρ, with β coefficients (excepting β0) set to
the OLS values; where any other parameters (η, µ and δ-vector) are set to zero
in the grid search.
3) Use the values selected in the grid search as starting values in an iterative
procedure (using the DFP Quasi-Newton method) to obtain the final maximum
likelihood (ML) estimates.
After some preliminary estimates and numerical exercises, we call this relatively strict
procedure (with regard to the optimality region of the logL value) into question and
suggest to replace the second step by:
2’) Estimate the model, i.e. maximize the likelihood function over the β- and
ui-vector, under the assumption of the nested standard normal distribution
ui ∼ N+ (0, 1). This can be done by approaching the logL value of the OLS
estimate in incremental steps, starting from a zero-value.14 Values of η and the
δ-vector are set to zero in this grid search. From the final estimates of residual-
and inefficiency-vectors, one obtains a value for ρ. This value, together with
the final β-vector estimate, completes the initial values for step 3).
Contrary to the practice of existing related studies (e.g. Dawson et al., 2000, Table
1), we base our choice of model (out of the considered specifications: OLS, HN error
decomposition model, TN error decomposition model, HN-TE effects model, and
TN-TE effects model) on Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests for
H0 : ui ≥ 0.
The latter is a joint equality and inequality hypothesis. Its test statistic is a mixture
of χ2 distributions, where upper and lower bounds for critical values are given in
14A code for GAUSS, using the GPE2 package by Lin (2001), is available on request from the
authors. It implies a stopping criterion, in the sense that it restricts the incremental grid search to
take no longer than 24 hours on a PC with the power of a Pentium IV CPU.
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Kodde and Palm (1986). Another indication and test criterion for the presence of
technical inefficiency in the data is the third moment of the distribution of the OLS
residuals: If ui = 0 for all i = 1, ...,N , then the OLS error εi = vi is symmetric,
and the data do not support a technical inefficiency story. However, if ui > 0, then
εi = vi − ui is negatively skewed, and there is evidence of technical efficiency in the
data; see Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, Section 3.2.2). Since negative skewness occurs
when S3 =
1
N
SN
i

εi−ε
eσε

< 0, a test of the hypothesis that S3 ≥ 0 is appropriate.
The test by Coelli (1995) avails this feature of the OLS residual vector. Accordingly,
under the null of zero skewness of the error terms in equation (1), the following test
statistic K is asymptotically distributed as standard normal
K = S3u
6(eσ2ε)
N
a∼ N (0, 1) .
In the next section, we report our results, where the choice of model has been based
on the above strategy 1), 2’), and 3) and tests on the adequate specification out of the
set: OLS, HN error decomposition model, TN error decomposition model, HN-TE
effects model, and TN-TE effects model.
3. Results
3.1 Success on the Pitch: Sporting Efficiency
As argued above, the residuals of the OLS estimate reported in (4’) are suggestive
for a stochastic frontier model to the extent that they are negatively skewed, as
reflected in a third moment S3 = −0.106. The implied test statistic by Coelli (1995),
K = −0.713, rejects the OLS model on all levels of significance. However, from the
remaining four specifications considered, it is only the TN error decomposition (TN-
ED) model that passes the LR test against OLS. The corresponding LR test statistic
equals 3.719 and rejects OLS in favor of the TN-ED model on the five percentage
level; see Kodde and Palm (1986). The final ML estimate is
ln (SCO) = 1.360∗ + 0.401∗ ln (PLW ) + 0.385∗INT + ε, where (6)
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εi ∈ ε and εi = vi − ui for i = 1, ..., 36;
vi ∼ N

0,σ2v

and ui ∼ N+

eµ,σ2u

;
eρ = σ
2
u
σ2v + σ2u
= 0.999∗, and eµ = 0.574∗;
corresponding logL:−12.305; ‘*’ denotes significant estimate on all conventional levels
of significance.
The efficiency transforms EFFi = exp (−ui) of the inefficiency parameters ui are
displayed in Table 3 below. Again, it is noteworthy that we abstract from COW as
well in our stochastic frontier model (6) due to the fact that wages of coaches neither
play a significant role in the determination of athletic output nor in the creation of
an efficient environment (TE effects specification) according to our estimates. Not
surprisingly, INT is again estimated strongly significant as teams can ceteris paribus
attain more SCO-points if qualified internationally.
Table 3 provides the ranking of the 36 observations based on the estimated
efficiency-vector for the 21 clubs at stake. SC Freiburg wins the race with an es-
timated technical efficiency of 0.9993 in season 2000/01, being closely followed by
FC Bayern Mu¨nchen with its 1999/00 performance and FC Schalke 04 in 2000/01.
At the bottom of the table, we find MSV Duisburg in 1999/00 with an estimated
efficiency of less than one fourth of SC Freiburg. How might this be explained? The
case of Freiburg (00/01) is quite well known: The team from the South-Western cor-
ner of Germany had the third smallest budget in terms of players, in both years, but
finished with the seventh highest number of SCO-points (8.86) without participating
in an international European competition. This is a good example of efficiency in our
specified framework. FC Bayern Mu¨nchen (99/00) made the third highest investment
in terms of players’ salaries in 1999/00 but also transformed them into an outstanding
amount of 23 SCO-points by winning the domestic league and cup competition, as
well as making it to the semi-final of the Champions League.
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Table 3. SCO Efficiency ranking based on TN error decomposition model
RANK CLUB SEASON TECHN. EFFICIENCY
1 SC FREIBURG 00/01 0.9993+
2 FC BAYERN MU¨NCHEN 99/00 0.9992+
3 FC SCHALKE 04 00/01 0.9992+
4 SV WERDER BREMEN 99/00 0.8794+
5 FC BAYERN MU¨NCHEN 00/01 0.8583+
6 SC FREIBURG 99/00 0.8059+
7 HANSA ROSTOCK 99/00 0.7768+
8 VFB STUTTGART 99/00 0.6871+
9 BAYER 04 LEVERKUSEN 99/00 0.6368+
10 SSV ULM 99/00 0.6266+
11 VFL WOLFSBURG 00/01 0.6253+
12 1. FC KAISERSLAUTERN 00/01 0.6228+
13 FC ENERGIE COTTBUS 00/01 0.6090+
14 HANSA ROSTOCK 00/01 0.5825+
15 VFB STUTTGART 00/01 0.5691+
16 VFL WOLFSBURG 99/00 0.5608−
17 SV WERDER BREMEN 00/01 0.5374−
18 HAMBURGER SV 99/00 0.5326−
19 HERTHA BSC BERLIN 99/00 0.5192−
20 BORUSSIA DORTMUND 00/01 0.5181−
21 VFL BOCHUM 00/01 0.4803−
22 TSV 1860 MU¨NCHEN 99/00 0.4733−
23 HERTHA BSC BERLIN 00/01 0.4677−
24 SPVGG UNTERHACHING 00/01 0.4535−
25 TSV 1860 MU¨NCHEN 00/01 0.4522−
26 1. FC KO¨LN 00/01 0.4434−
27 BAYER 04 LEVERKUSEN 00/01 0.4324−
28 SPVGG UNTERHACHING 99/00 0.4239−
29 1. FC KAISERSLAUTERN 99/00 0.4126−
30 ARMINIA BIELEFELD 99/00 0.4087−
31 EINTRACHT FRANKFURT 99/00 0.3855−
32 BORUSSIA DORTMUND 99/00 0.3497−
33 EINTRACHT FRANKFURT 00/01 0.3032−
34 HAMBURGER SV 00/01 0.2982−
35 FC SCHALKE 04 99/00 0.2910−
36 MSV DUISBURG 99/00 0.2161−
Note: Mean efficiency: 0.5621; ‘+’ (‘−’) indicates above (below) average efficiency.
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FC Schalke 04 shows the third highest level of efficiency due to its 2000/01 do-
mestic performances, i.e. without playing internationally. They attained the second
most SCO-points in that season, winning the national cup and historically losing the
Bundesliga to FC Bayern Mu¨nchen in the extra time of the season. The story was
quite different for FC Schalke 04 the year before: Investing the third highest PLW
of the season, they collected only 3.81 SCO-points ending last but one in Table 3.
They are underperformed only by MSV Duisburg, the club that achieved an even less
athletic output (i.e. 22 league points, knock-out in the second round of the national
cup) than their relatively low budget (i.e. 5.88 million EUR) indicated.
Looking at the 15 clubs that participated in the Bundesliga in both seasons, it
is interesting to assess intertemporal performance. FC Bayern Mu¨nchen and SC
Freiburg performed very efficiently in both years. Overall winner SC Freiburg is
ranked sixth with their 1999/00 performance. FC Bayern Mu¨nchen takes second and
fifth place. Ordering clubs by the sum of their subsequent ranking positions for an ad
hoc intertemporal assessment, results in the pattern of Table 4. Eintracht Frankfurt,
obviously, shows the most persistently weak performance. Its efficiency estimates are
the fourth (2000/01) and the sixth lowest (1999/00) for the 36 points of observation.
The table also highlights that FC Schalke 04, by far, displays the highest volatility
in performance when comparing the two seasons. As mentioned above, after a poor
1999/00 season this club overperformed in 2000/01 without significantly increasing
investment in players’ salaries.
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Table 4. Bundesliga-participants in both seasons by EFF-Ranks
CLUB EFF-Rank EFF-Rank EFF-Rank (sum)
in 1999/00 in 2000/01 both seasons
SC FREIBURG (1) 6 1 7
FC BAYERN MU¨NCHEN 2 5 7
WERDER BREMEN (3) 4 15 19
HANSA ROSTOCK 7 12 19
VFB STUTTGART (5) 12 13 21
VFL WOLFSBURG (6) 14 10 24
BAYER 04 LEVERKUSEN (7) 9 23 32
FC SCHALKE 04 (8) 30 3 33
1. FC KAISERSLAUTERN (9) 25 11 36
HERTHA BSC BERLIN (10) 17 20 37
TSV 1860 MU¨NCHEN (11) 19 22 41
BORUSSIA DORTMUND (12) 27 18 45
HAMBURGER SV 16 29 45
SPVGG UNTERHACHING 24 21 45
EINTRACHT FRANKFURT (15) 26 28 54
Note: In parantheses respective rank according to the sum of EFF-ranks is given.
3.2 Success off the Pitch: Economic Efficiency.
Contrary to (4’), OLS estimate (3) neither shows a weak fit nor any indication in
favor of an ED or TE effects model. Although none of the considered stochastic
frontier models passes the adequate LR test, we succeed in marginally improving the
likelihood by decomposing the error term.
Table 5. OLS and Stochastic Frontier estimates for dependent variable ln(REV)
Model CONST ln(PLW) ln(COW) UFA CHL S01 ρ logL
OLS 1.936***
(3.760)
0.545***
(2.813)
0.271**
(2.168)
0.403***
(3.169)
0.485***
(3.219)
-.237**
(-2.34)
− -2.555
HSN 3.510***
(6.861)
0.513***
(4.143)
0.177
(0.918)
0.777***
(6.119)
0.445***
(2.960)
-.153
(-1.51)
− -2.438
HN 1.947***
(3.491)
0.544***
(3.132)
0.274**
(2.425)
0.404***
(3.402)
0.484***
(3.604)
-.240**
(-2.59)
0.001 -2.465
Note: *, **, *** denotes significance on 10, 5, 1% level of significance; t-values given in parentheses.
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In analogy to equation (6) above, Table (5) displays our estimates with best fit.
As argued above, we used a half normal ED model to obtain initial values for the
DFP algorithm in the estimation of the HD-ED model.
As described in Section 2.2, we not only find that there is a significant coherence
between wages of players and coaches and the overall economic output of a team,
but also learn that there is a technological downward shift from season 1999/00 to
2000/01. This means, in terms of our supposed production function, that more
wages had to be invested to reach the same REV level than in the year before. Here
the “rat race” for the limited amount of output comes back into play. PLW, e.g.,
climbed by 23% on average between 1999/00 and 2000/01, COW by 26%. One of
the components of revenues that cannot be extended for all league members is the
cash flow from broadcasting rights that now has been directly linked to the sporting
performance of the clubs.
The significance of our UFA variable neither comes as a surprise. Nine out of
the top ten clubs in the UFA poll played in the German top league in 1999/00
and 2000/01. Having many fans can usually be attributed to some tradition of
success: Each of the top five clubs either won the domestic league or the national
cup competition at least once in the seasons 1996/97-2001/02. Obviously, title wins
in the past and/or the present generate a large fan community.15 Having many
fans implies large attendances, a higher-than-average merchandising potential, an
attractiveness for sponsors, etc. and, therefore, higher revenues. The CHL dummy
is, again not surprisingly, the most significant variable of the ln(REV) OLS-equation
(3). In 2000/01 FC Bayern Mu¨nchen generated more than 50 million EUR (total
revenue: 173 million EUR) solely by their winning of the Champions League. For
first round drop-outs in the Champions League, German teams are still consoled with
13-15 million EUR due to the financially strong German TV-market in comparison
to other European (Champions League participating) countries.
15A different story might hold for Hansa Rostock being the only Bundesliga team from the former
GDR for a long time. They benefit from a regional monopoly and a strong sympathy throughout
the Neue Bundesla¨nder.
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Table 6 (a). REV Efficiencies (1999/00): OLS and error decomposition models
OLS model HN ED model HSN ED model
CLUB RK RK RK
0.9986+...a
VFB STUTTGART 1 0.524 1 4702e−5 1 0.845
SSV ULM 2 0.317 3 4380e−5 7 0.683
EINTRACHT FRANKFURT 3 0.316 2 4383e−5 8 0.680
SV WERDER BREMEN 4 0.251 4 4281e−5 2 0.786
ARMINIA BIELEFELD 5 0.159 5 4130e−5 5 0.708
SC FREIBURG 6 0.141 6 4102e−5 13 0.424
VFL WOLFSBURG 7 0.113 7 4065e−5 9 0.662
MSV DUISBURG 8 0.064 8 3986e−5 4 0.714
FC BAYERN MU¨NCHEN 9 0.046 9 3952e−5 3 0.730
HANSA ROSTOCK 10 0.030 10 3933e−5 16 0.324
BORUSSIA DORTMUND 11 -.067 11 3776e−5 14 0.417
BAYER 04 LEVERKUSEN 12 -.083 12 3755e−5 15 0.389
SPVGG UNTERHACHING 13 -.127 13 3685e−5 6 0.701
TSV 1860 MU¨NCHEN 14 -.325 14 3372e−5 11 0.459
1. FC KAISERSLAUTERN 15 -.328 15 3371e−5 18 0.223
HAMBURGER SV 16 -.332 16 3353e−5 17 0.309
HERTHA BSC BERLIN 17 -.339 17 3352e−5 12 0.442
FC SCHALKE 04 18 -.362 18 3318e−5 10 0.513
Note: ED - error decomposition model; HSN - half standard normal; RK - rank.
a for HN-ED model: efficiency estimate equals row value + 0.9986.
In the following economic efficiencies are discussed for those teams that showed a
robust ‘top’ or ‘flop’ ranking pattern. Being part of the respective upper or lower
quartile (top-4 / flop-4) of the ranking for all three models, is considered a robust
result. As can be seen from Table 6 (a) above, VfB Stuttgart clearly dominates all
three rankings of REV efficiency in 1999/00. An explanation needs to be based on all
the relevant variables: In the respective season, VfB Stuttgart invested the league-
average amount of money into PLW and COW;16 while, in terms of REV, it ended
fifth. The decisive factor for reaching the top, in terms of efficiency value estimates,
16In detail, this corresponds to rank nine (eight) for PLW (COW).
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therefore, seems to be that the club attained this relatively high REV with average
wages. Furthermore, this stands despite the fact that its team neither participated
in the Champions League in 1999/00 nor does it belong to the better loved half of
the league (UFA fan dummy = 0).
Surprisingly, Stuttgart ended at the very bottom in the succeeding season; see
Table 6 (b). The club increased wages for its staff above the average but reached
a rather low (adjusted) REV of 14.7 million EUR. This might to some degree be
explained by its weak performance in the national league that season (ending 15th).
SV Werder Bremen also turns out to be robustly top4-efficient (as regards REV)
in 1999/00. The club generated the eight highest REV with below-average PLW
and, remarkably, by paying their coach the second lowest salary. Being one of the
nine most popular clubs (according to our UFA variable), seems to have no affect
on its efficiency. The argument goes the other way around for 1. FC Kaiserslautern
and Hamburger SV in 1999/00: Both clubs seem unable to transform their high
COW (second and fifth highest) as well as their popularity, in terms of UFA, into
corresponding REV results. In regard to the top quartiles of REV efficiency for season
2000/01, FC Schalke 04 is the only club to operate consistently well. In this case,
the below average COW and the absence in the Champions League seem to outweigh
the fourth-highest PLW. Hansa Rostock is the second club apart from VfB Stuttgart
that stands out for its exceptionally weak performance in this season. Low PLW and
the second lowest COW (0.22 million EUR) obviously do not justify the third lowest
REV of 11.53 million EUR, as reflected by its estimated efficiency term. In this case,
the message from the underlying OLS model is that the club from the coast of the
Baltic Sea could have made more out of its popularity in the East German region
(UFA fan dummy = 1).
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Table 6 (b). REV Efficiencies (2000/0!): OLS and error decomposition models
OLS model TN ED. model HSN ED model
CLUB RK RK RK
0.9986+...a
BORUSSIA DORTMUND 1 0.593 1 4809e−5 6 0.594
FC BAYERN MU¨NCHEN 2 0.393 2 4506e−5 8 0.550
FC SCHALKE 04 3 0.236 3 4249e−5 1 0.772
1. FC KO¨LN 4 0.219 4 4214e−5 12 0.467
SV WERDER BREMEN 5 0.151 5 4129e−5 16 0.359
1. FC KAISERSLAUTERN 6 0.114 6 4063e−5 7 0.551
BAYER 04 LEVERKUSEN 7 0.072 7 3996e−5 11 0.505
EINTRACHT FRANKFURT 8 0.001 8 3889e−5 15 0.359
HERTHA BSC BERLIN 9 -.008 9 3873e−5 14 0.364
HAMBURGER SV 10 -.022 11 3846e−5 10 0.515
FC ENERGIE COTTBUS 11 -.024 10 3852e−5 2 0.698
SC FREIBURG 12 -.086 12 3752e−5 13 0.446
TSV 1860 MU¨NCHEN 13 -.086 13 3748e−5 4 0.672
VFL BOCHUM 14 -.167 14 3621e−5 9 0.533
SPVGG UNTERHACHING 15 -.177 15 3606e−5 3 0.687
VFL WOLFSBURG 16 -.339 16 3349e−5 5 0.633
HANSA ROSTOCK 17 -.355 17 3316e−5 18 0.248
VFB STUTTGART 18 -.512 18 3077e−5 17 0.328
Note: ED - error decomposition model; HSN - half standard normal; RK - rank.
a for TN-ED model: efficiency estimate equals row value + 0.9986.
4. Conclusion
The present study contributes to the existing literature on managerial efficiency in
professional team sports. In a stochastic frontier framework we empirically assess the
performance of German Bundesliga-clubs in the two seasons 1999/00 and 2000/01.
In contrast to existing studies applying DEA, we are able to make significance based
statements and to consider stochastic deviations from the efficiency frontier. Fur-
thermore, we choose our production technology specifications on a series of tests and
refine the estimation procedure proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995).
The player talent constitution of teams is found to be of paramount importance
for success on and off the pitch. Surprisingly, paying a high salary to the coach seems
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to have no significant impact on the athletic output. A robust pattern of technical
efficiency over the subsequent seasons is found for athletic performance, while the
estimates based on economic output highlight the instability of the German soccer
industry. In both cases only a few clubs show persistently a low or high level of
efficiency.
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Appendix
Appendix A.1
The SCO variable: Aggregating performance in up to three competitions
In most studies of team or coaching efficiency in professional soccer performance is
measured by the achievement only in the national league competition.17 Since the
teams know by the end of each season for which national and international compe-
titions in the following season they are qualified, they also base their pre-seasonal
investment on this knowledge. Not only more competitions mean more matches and
therefore require a larger squad they also mean more income.
In the present study, we are the first to construct a variable “score” (SCO) that
takes into account the performances in all four competitions of relevance for German
teams. Apart from the league competition all 18 Bundesliga-clubs are automatically
qualified for the national cup (i.e. the DFB-Cup)18, too. Internationally, German
clubs can qualify for the UEFA-Cup19 or for the UEFA Champions League (UEFA-
CL)20. Therefore a German club could play 57 matches at maximum in one season
(34 matches in the league, six in the DFB-Cup, and 17 matches in the UEFA-CL).
Even though not necessarily every club management in Germany might agree, there
is a broad consensus about the relative importance of the four potential competitions:
Winning the UEFA Champions League is ranked the highest achievement in European
professional soccer. The national league (Bundesliga) is ranked second due to the fact
that the German league is considered a rather high-level competition by European
standards. The UEFA-Cup title is an international achievement but most clubs would
prefer winning the national league ceteris paribus. The DFB-Cup certainly receives
17One exception being Gerrard (2001) who also considers the domestic (English) cup competitions.
18DFB-Cup in 1999-2001: six one-leg knock-out rounds with the “1st Round” being the round in
which the 18 top league clubs enter the competition.
19UEFA-Cup in 1999-2001: seven knock-out rounds with two legs, final is one match; for qualifi-
cation rounds and the UI-cup no points are attributed.
20UEFA Champions League in 1999-2001: two group stages, two-leg knock-outs from the quarter
final, final is one match, qualification rounds are not considered.
26
the least weight in Germany, especially, since it generates the least additional money
and due to the possibility of winning the title after lucky draws and only six matches.
We take the above ranking as a basis for our scoring-system. Winning the UEFA-
CL is ascribed ten, the national league nine, the UEFA-Cup eight, and finally the
DFB-Cup seven SCO-points. Economic implications of the different performances
do not play a role in the construction of the SCO-variable. It is only the success on
the pitch that is being reflected in SCO-points. We, therefore, clearly discriminate
between the marginal impact of reaching a final and actually winning it. The reason
is that title-wins are what success on the pitch is standing for and less semi-final
qualifications etc. Accordingly, the runner-up in the UEFA-CL (UEFA-Cup, DFB-
Cup) receives eight (six, five) SCO-points, the two semi-final losers seven (five, four)
SCO-points. This system also ensures that the ordinal ranking of the three cup
competitions stays the same whichever group stage. Table A.1 shows the SCO-points
that could be achieved in the 1999-2001 seasons for the eight (DFB-Cup: seven)
possible outcomes in those three competitions. Clubs that ended up third in the first
group stage of the UEFA-CL dropped out of the UEFA-CL but entered the third
round of the UEFA-Cup. They therefore could still reach a minimum of two SCO-
points from the international cup competitions. In 1999/00 (2000/01) Germany had
four (three) teams starting in the UEFA-CL and three (five) teams in the UEFA-Cup.
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Table A.1. Receivable SCO-points in 1999/00 and 2000/01
for DFB-/UEFA-Cup DFB-Cup UEFA-Cup UEFA-CL for UEFA-CL
Winner 7 8 10 Winner
Runner-Up 5 6 8 Runner-Up
Semi-Final-K.O. 4 5 7 Semi-Final-K.O.
Quarter-Final-K.O. 3 4 6 Quarter-Final-K.O.
1/8-Final-K.O. 2 3 4 3rd pl./2nd group stage
3rd-Round-K.O. does not exist 2 3 4th pl./2nd group stage
2nd-Round-K.O. 1 1 0 3rd pl./1st group stage
1st-Round-K.O. 0 0 0 4th pl./2nd group stage
Note: Arrow indicates drop-out in UEFA-CL 3rd pl./1st group stage continues in UEFA-Cup 3rd round.
In the national league competition the teams play 34 matches against each other
and collect three points for a win, one point for a draw. We decided to transform
the points in the league rather than the final league position into our SCO-system
such that success on the pitch is mapped more exactly. As in the other competitions
the runner-up stays two SCO-points short of the champion, i.e. they collect seven
SCO-points. Teams finishing third or lower receive SCO-points determined by the
following equation:
SCOi |league = 9

league-pointsi
league-pointsCh

− 2, (A.1)
where league position i = 3, ..., 18 and subscript Ch denoting champion.
By (A.1) the league performance is benchmarked to the performance of the cham-
pion with the restriction that no other team can collect more than seven SCO-points.
Since we are not interested in the future economic implications of league positions,
there are no SCO-premiums or -discounts for European cup qualifications or relega-
tions. Table A.2 shows how many SCO-points the top league clubs collected from
the competitions in total and through the national league in 1999/00 and 2000/01,
respectively. Due to the fact that we are only looking at one-year SCO-performances
of top league clubs, cup participations of second division (Zweite Bundesliga) clubs
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are not accounted for. In one season a club can reach a maximum of 26 SCO-points.
In 1999/00, for example, FC Bayern Mu¨nchen is assigned an outstanding 23 SCO-
points by winning the national league as well as cup and reaching the semi-final in
the UEFA-CL. At the bottom end, MSV Duisburg only received 1.71 SCO-points in
1999/00, finishing last in the league with 22 points (FC Bayern Mu¨nchen: 73) and
dropping out of the national cup in the second round.
Table A.2. SCO-points total and from league for seasons 1999/00 and 2000/0121
CLUB SCO (total) SCO (total) SCO (league) SCO (league)
in 1999/00 in 2000/01 in 1999/00 in 2000/01
HERTHA BSC BERLIN 9.16 9.00 4.16 6.00
ARMINIA BIELEFELD 3.70 N.P. 1.70 N.P.
VFL BOCHUM N.P. 4.86 N.P. 1.86
SV WERDER BREMEN 12.79 8.57 3.79 5.57
FC ENERGIE COTTBUS N.P. 4.57 N.P. 3.57
BORUSSIA DORTMUND 7.93 8.29 2.93 6.29
MSV DUISBURG 1.71 N.P. 0.71 N.P.
EINTRACHT FRANKFURT 3.81 3.00 2.81 3.00
SC FREIBURG 5.93 8.86 2.93 5.86
HAMBURGER SV 6.27 5.86 5.27 3.86
1. FC KAISERSLAUTERN 7.16 11.14 4.16 5.14
1. FC KO¨LN N.P. 4.57 N.P. 4.57
BAYER 04 LEVERKUSEN 11.00 9.14 7.00 6.14
TSV 1860 MU¨NCHEN 5.53 8.29 4.53 4.29
FC BAYERN MU¨NCHEN 23.00 20.00 9.00 9.00
HANSA ROSTOCK 6.68 5.14 2.68 4.14
FC SCHALKE 04 3.81 14.00 2.81 7.00
VFB STUTTGART 6.92 10.43 3.92 3.43
SSV ULM 4.32 N.P. 2.32 N.P.
SPVGG UNTERHACHING 3.42 4.00 3.42 3.00
VFL WOLFSBURG 8.04 6.71 4.04 4.71
Note: Clubs in alphabetical order of brand-constituting city, region or district.
21N.P. denotes team not participating in the Erste Bundesliga in the respective season.
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Appendix A.2
Descriptive statistics of non-dummy variables
Table A.3. Descriptive statistics of central (non-dummy) variables
Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
SCO a. 7.708 6.816 23.00 1.712 4.428 1.703 6.378
REV [million EUR] 37.49 25.03 157.2 8.751 35.32 1.983 6.489
PLW p.a. [million EUR] 14.87 12.55 33.20 4.090 8.328 0.853 2.832
COW p.a. [million EUR] 0.676 0.534 1.841 0.135 0.497 1.097 3.251
Note: a. For detail see Appendix A.1.
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